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European Democracy in Action

An Open Europe in a Multipolar World: Lessons from the Portuguese Experience

This paper, written on the occasion of the Portuguese Presidency, discusses the options available to the Union to establish itself as a major actor on the world scene. Based on an analysis of twenty years of EU membership, it describes how international issues fit with Portuguese thinking about Europe. In the light of the current re-emergence of multi-polarity, it examines ways for the Union to strengthen multilateralism, the strategic cornerstone of EU foreign policy, and discusses the key linkage between internal and external policy issues.

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An Open Europe in a Multipolar World: Lessons from the Portuguese Experience

Álvaro de VASCONCELOS

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An Open Europe in a Multipolar World: Lessons from the Portuguese Experience

By ÁLVARO DE VASCONCELOS



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Introduction

The year before the start of the Portuguese presidency of the EU in 2000, I wrote an article, “Portugal’s European Path,” for the *Notre Europe* Association, then directed by its founding president, Jacques Delors. It is still relevant today. Portugal’s European path, officially inaugurated in 1986, remains essentially unchanged. Much deeper changes have since reshaped the rest of the world. As a way to address domestic and foreign change, the Union – and Portugal within it – has sought to establish systems of regional and global governance. It struck me as more interesting to develop the section in the “European Path” article¹ about Portugal’s vision of the world as a member State of the EU, rather than update the rest of the article.

The paper starts with a look at the Portuguese experience of European integration. It explores how Europe – which has, since Portuguese accession, expanded to include twelve new countries, and is now about to formalise a reform of EU institutions – can fulfil its global responsibilities more effectively. In particular, it asks how the Union can combine effective multilateral governance with its web of old and new bilateral relations. As luck would have it, during the Portuguese presiden-

¹ See: “Portugal 2000: The European Way,” *Notre Europe* Research and Policy Paper 9, Paris, March 2000.

cy of the Union there are summits scheduled with Brazil, China, India and Russia, as well as a second summit with the African Union (the first was held in Cairo in 2000 during Portugal's second Union presidency), which was planned especially to coincide with Portugal's most recent presidency. In addition to presiding over the final touches to the reform treaty, which will contain potentially important changes to EU foreign policy, Portugal must preside over this succession of summits. Its presidency is a truly global one. It is necessary to take advantage of this to promote a new vision of rule-based international relations forged with the full involvement of the so-called emerging powers.

Portugal has supported an "open Europe" so it is in a good position to take up that challenge. Now is the time, with the end in sight of the rotating national presidencies in the foreign policy arena, to assess the contributions to Union performance of countries with strong extra-European historical ties. Whether or not it is advantageous to have one name and one face fronting Union foreign policy, this is an opportunity not to be missed, and it should be taken up by the next "EU Minister of Foreign Affairs," or whatever the title of the position may be. It is not a matter of indifference (quite the opposite in fact) to know how traditional relations, the specificities of historical contexts, and human experiences such as emigration/immigration can contribute to a common European foreign policy. How, then, can the Union "Europeanise" eminently national policies, combine them to make a European policy, and turn them into trump cards of EU foreign relations? How can Europe become "global," preserve its founding values, turn its vast time-woven patchwork heritage into a truly European one, without engaging in any neo-colonial flights of fantasy? As Jürgen Habermas and Jacques Derrida both pointed out in their support for a united Europe with a common foreign policy, the "European conscience" has not only rejected war but also colonial domination: "the Union is not just the fruit of the conscience of the tragedy of two world wars that started in Europe, but also of the experience of loss of Empire and self-criticism regarding the colonial past."² The Portuguese, who Eduardo Lourenço said are "superlatively European," have strong ties with all the member States of the Union because of the peculiarities of their recent history, including shifts from colonialism and isolationism to strong European commitment; from dictatorship to an arduous climb out

of underdevelopment; from migratory drain and diaspora, to receiving hundreds of thousands of migrants. For these reasons among others, the Portuguese experience is essential for an understanding of how EU international policy can gain in substance and efficiency, and to enable the EU to benefit from the vision and theoretical and practical contribution of individual states and regions.

In the first part of this article, with the benefit of a twenty year hindsight view of EU membership, I describe how international issues fit with Portuguese thinking about Europe, with a special emphasis on the issue of enlargement. In the second part, in light of the re-emergence of multipolarity, I examine how the presidency and the Union can reaffirm multilateralism, the strategic cornerstone of EU foreign policy. The third section discusses the "internal as external" or "inter-mesticity"³, because the global influence of the Union depends in large measure on its internal configuration. Finally, there is an annex providing essential economic and political data on Portugal (updated from the article published in 2000).

² Jacques Derrida and Jürgen Habermas, "Europe: plaidoyer pour une politique extérieure commune", *Libération*, 31 May 2003.

³ Franz Gress coined the term "intermestic" to refer to the combined international and domestic politics involving the German Lander. See: Franz Gress, "Interstate Cooperation and Territorial Representation in Intermestic Politics", *Publius* 26, 1996: 53-72.

I - Tradition and “Europeanisation”

It is useful to remember that Portugal acceded to the EU for essentially political reasons: the consolidation of democracy and the search for what Mario Soares calls “a new destiny” (*novo destino*) to replace the Empire that had been lost in inglorious colonial wars. Some social sectors with strong traditionalist and isolationist positions that still have remnants of influence feel that, because of EU membership, Portugal is losing its ‘special’ traditional relationships and has to put up with “competition” from its European partners in the (not very appropriately named) Lusophone world. But the two dominant parties that have alternated in power since 1985 both see EU membership as a powerful trump card that can further empower Portuguese relations with the countries of the Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries (*Comunidade dos Países de Língua Portuguesa*, CPLP)⁴. Most Portuguese leaders and intellectuals hold similar views. According to Brazilian sociologist Hélio Jaguaribe, “Because it is a member of the EEC and because of its participation in the Luso-Brazilian cultural universe, Portugal will open the door to an important space within the [European] Community for Brazil and, by extension, to Brazil’s Latin American partners.”⁵

⁴ The Community was established in July 1996 by seven countries (Angola, Brazil, Cape Verde, Guiné-Bissau, Mozambique, Portugal, and S. Tomé e Príncipe), which were later joined by East Timor in May 2002.

⁵ Hélio Jaguaribe, “Portugal e Brasil perante a integração Europeia”, *Estratégia* (Lisbon: 6, 1989).

In its turn, the EEC recognized the benefits of Portuguese accession accruing to European foreign policy, as stated at the accession ceremony: “Portugal’s historical, cultural and economic ties with Latin America, Africa and Asia constitute an important contribution to the action to which the Community is committed, with a view to creating the bases for new equilibrium and new opportunities for peace, particularly in the areas of greatest international tension.”⁶

Twenty years on, it is clear that Portugal – and Spain – have fostered closer ties between Europe and Latin America. Indeed, Latin America is a priority in the foreign policy of both countries, and variations in the intensity of relations have very little to do with the political orientation of governments on either side of the Atlantic. Brazil and Africa have always been priority for the Portuguese presidency of the Union, including this most recent one. As Prime Minister José Sócrates said when presenting the Portuguese Presidency programme to the European Parliament, Portugal hopes to make a “specific contribution to enrich European foreign policy” by promoting the Brazil summit. The summit with the African Union is also a priority, and Portugal has worked very hard to make it happen. It is also the view of the Portuguese presidency that any idea of dividing Africa up into “special domains,” so that some EU countries focus on particular African countries or subregions to the detriment of a global “EU Africa outlook,” is mistaken and should be abandoned.⁷

This view of the national interest as being part of a much broader, shared interest shapes the attitude of many toward the role of Portugal in Europe and the world. Although Portugal obviously pursues “Portuguese” foreign policy goals, it views them as an integral part of a broad “European interest.”

Portugal has contributed to European foreign policy, but being in Europe has also added a new dimension to Portuguese foreign policy: relations with the Maghreb (with which Portugal has very strong, non-colonial, historical ties) and the Mediterranean became an increasingly important foreign policy “interest” after accession, and there are substantial economic interests at play, too. Before

accession, the Maghreb was not a Portuguese foreign policy priority; Portugal actually felt it was risky to take an interest in Mediterranean issues because of the role played by the Lajes airbase in the Azores in U.S. Middle East operations. It was because of European membership Portugal that became more like other southern European countries, attaching greater importance to Euro-Mediterranean relations. This is particularly evident in Portugal’s commitment to the Barcelona Process. The increasingly prominent place of relations with the Mediterranean provides a clear example of the Europeanisation of Portuguese foreign policy. Last, but not least, Europeanisation has breathed new life into the so-called ‘traditional’ external relations.

After accession, particularly during the 1990s, Portugal’s historical relations with extra-European regions intensified and acquired greater density; at the same time, participation in European defense initiatives, which was considered compatible with the pre-existing commitment to NATO after some hesitation, became a fundamental aspect of Portuguese defence policy. The Europeanization of a number of high-ranking Portuguese officials is interesting from this point of view, as they became more pragmatic with growing involvement in EU activities than the old geopolitical Atlanticists, whose thought had dominated Portuguese military thinking for so long.

In the first years of the twenty-first century an international arena marked by unilateralism generated a great deal of bewilderment, particularly within Europe, and seriously complicated the Euro-Atlantic balance sought by Portugal foreign policy. It showed that when Portugal has to choose between the European path and Atlantic solidarity, many Portuguese politicians will hesitate, particularly when it comes to security issues, as was the case with the Iraq war. But they are not very different from their European counterparts in this respect. At the same time, Portugal backed the creation of a European defence policy, and increased its participation in UN operations (it took part in the international mission in Bosnia from 1996 to 2007, and maintains a military presence in Kosovo, Afghanistan and the Lebanon).

⁶ Speech by Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs and President of the Acting European Council, Giulio Andreotti, at the signature of the Acts of Accession, 12 June 1985.

⁷ For instance, I have heard this view expressed by Portuguese Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and Cooperation, João Cravinho.

Relations with Brazil, which had been limited to the cultural sphere for decades, received a strong impetus and gained political and economic substance. Brazil, which had been the main destination for Portuguese migrants during the first half of the twentieth century, became one of the main – if not the principal – source of Portuguese economic internationalization. Fears that membership of the EEC might erode relations with Brazil proved to be unfounded, and many of those favouring a strong dichotomy between Europe and the Atlantic were forced to admit their mistake. There was a peninsular impetus to intensify economic and political Euro-Latin American relations. The first ministerial meeting between the European Community and the Common Southern Market known as Mercosur occurred under the Portuguese presidency in 1992, at a time when the EU saw the Mercosur as a strategic partner that partly emulated and exemplified Europe's preferred kind of regionalism, one based on "deep integration."

Portugal and Spain turned various 'circles' of cooperation with Latin America "Euro-ward," most notably the Ibero-American Summit process, the Secretariat of which is in Madrid. However, their commitment to Latin America (their role within the European Commission, and the emphasis they placed on Latin America under their respective presidencies) was insufficient to consolidate a strategic relationship with the Mercosur. The 1995 Framework Agreement never led to the hoped for Free Trade Agreement, which shipwrecked in the same stormy waters that brought down the Doha Round. This example illustrates the limits of the role of "national champions:" Portugal and Spain influenced EU policy toward Latin America, pushing the region up the ladder of Union priorities. Ultimately, though, the support of other member States was necessary. Relative peace in the region and the context of exacerbated post-11 September fears pushed Latin America back down the ladder of European priorities. The indefinite postponement of a free trade agreement with the Mercosur robbed the Foreign Ministers meeting at Guimarães of impetus, and hopes for a strategic partnership withered away (in truth, Portugal and Spain and some other countries were ambivalent about the impact that such an agreement would have on the Common Agricultural Policy). As this example shows, however much the member States of the Union "Europeanise" their points of view, if they are unable to carry other states with them, this dilutes the "European-ness" of their actions.

Enlargement: Democracy First

If there is any country that clearly backs the future enlargement of the Union today, that country is Portugal. For its "pro-European" leaders (in the Socialist and Social Democratic parties, the PS and PSD), opposing enlargement is close to heresy, given Portugal's recent history. There may be some hesitation at times, but support for enlargement prevails. Some political leaders were initially defensive about eastward enlargement, as they feared that Europe might shift away from the south and, above all, that there would be stiff competition for European funds. Civil society organisations and a part of the business elite were positive right from the start). When the EFTA countries joined in 1995, the reaction was different: Portugal was an EFTA member, these were primarily smaller and wealthy nations, and they backed the "Euro-prudent" view, which was influential in Portugal. Opposition to the accession of the new eastern democracies, which had already vanished at the time of the 2000 presidency, quickly came to be seen as unsustainable: Portuguese openness is the product of an awareness of just how important accession was to help consolidate democracy and promote development. The enlargement of the Union to the borders of the European continent is considered the most significant aspect of Union foreign policy, and the most important and original EU contribution to world peace. Indeed, "democratic inclusion" is the "European method" par excellence. It explains Europe's magnetism, particularly among neighbouring states that want to "join the club."

This vision is clear in the strong support among pro-European leaders for Turkish accession. In the words of Minister of Foreign Affairs Luís Amado, "the positive attraction of the EU can generate a virtuous cycle that will anchor [Turkey] strongly to Europe, we have a commitment to negotiate with Turkey and we should fulfil that commitment in good faith."⁸ The concept of an open Europe based on unity within diversity, is part of the discourse of Portuguese 'Europeanists.' Turkish accession would consolidate a diverse Europe, one that can integrate a country with a Muslim majority; at the same time, Turkey would become a strong example of democracy and peace in a region in which both goods are scarce. In the words of

⁸ Luís Amado, Luís Amado, "Packed Agenda," *The Parliament Magazine*, 249, 2 July 2007.

former Portuguese president, Jorge Sampaio, this is a “real crossroads for Europe: with Turkey Europe will be better off if it talks with Asia; without it, it is very likely that both continents will be compelled to turn their backs to one another.”⁹

The future of an ‘open Europe’ depends largely on whether Turkey joins after scrupulous compliance with stipulated membership conditions. Likewise, Turkish accession will affect the degree to which the EU is a magnet, and the ability of the Union to act and influence others in an increasingly multipolar world, a world that may well regress to a new kind of unstable power politics.

II - “Multilateralising” Multipolarity

Portugal’s third – and most probably last – presidency of the Union occurs in an international context that is quite different from that which prevailed during its prior presidencies, in 1992 and in 2000. In 1992 there were hopes of a new international order; in 2000, as the era of George Bush and Clinton came to a close, post-Cold War unipolarity led to an apparently “benign hegemony” under a barely contested U.S. “hyperpower,” and it was hoped that the international system was making a transition toward multilateralism and multi-regionalism à la européenne.

Since then, Europe has been forced to recognise that its strategic partners, the ones it hoped would work to build a multilateral world order – the US within the trans-Atlantic partnership, and emerging integration projects – now had to include other powers in its calculations. Regardless of what one thinks of the US today, Europe must pursue similar relationships with China, India, and to a different degree, Brazil and South Africa, as well as Russia, with its insistent “great power” pretensions and frequent “energy threats.” Among the most notable events on calendar of the Portuguese presidency of the EU – one that Portugal is very committed to – are the bilateral summits with Brazil, China, India and Russia (the BRIC countries,

⁹ Jorge Sampaio, “Voies vers la démocratie et inclusion dans la diversité,” speech at the Annual EuroMeSCo Conference, Istanbul, October 2006.

to use the recently coined acronym). Then there is the “bi-continental” summit with the African Union, to which various more or less consolidated regional integration processes and special EU ‘circles’ of cooperation are ‘glued.’ With these summits, the Union shows it has recognised that the world a multipolar one again.

How the Union deals with multipolarity in the twenty-first century, and organises its web of “strategic partnerships” is not a result of the view that these emerging powers compete with the US, but rather that without them key international problems, particularly economic, trade, and international financial issues, and eventually humanitarian and security issues, cannot be addressed. Consider the central role of China in the North Korean context; of Brazil in all South American issues; of Russia vis-à-vis Iran; or consider the importance of all these countries in energy and environmental issues. As Nicole Gnesotto underlines: “The West without the rest has become astonishingly powerless.”¹⁰

The issue of how to manage the emerging new powers is particularly important for Europe because it is not an “extra-European” issue but about finding solutions to problems affecting what Europe considers its “region.” Put differently and more succinctly, to speak of Europe as a “regional power” is in fact the same as speaking of it as an “international power” since the “region” that is Europe’s is so far reaching that it is global. Russia, the Caucasus countries and those of the Middle East are part of the EU neighbourhood; and Turkey, which is in the process of negotiating accession, has Iran, Iraq and Syria as neighbours. For Europe, just as the internal is external, the regional is international, and this is so not just because of the way that the world is changing, but because of the very nature of “Europe” as a political and economic actor.

Clearly, these new powers have yet to take on the global responsibilities that their status or ambition should confer on them, namely contributing to a fairer international order that is better able to regulate globalisation, and above all, to address an ever greater global disorder. The impotence of the international community in the face of poverty, humanitarian disasters, environmental degradation, and

conflicts from Darfur to the Middle East, is primarily the product of the abandonment of multilateral diplomacy by the US; but it is also a result of lack of effort by other great powers.

In recent years armed unilateralism, as exemplified by the Iraqi tragedy or the war in the Lebanon, has lost all credibility; but we are far from witnessing the triumph of an effective multilateralism than can underpin a European security strategy. We are closer to ‘ineffective unilateralism’ than to (an insufficiently practised) ‘effective multilateralism.’ This is particularly apparent in the Middle East, with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (This, as the European Security Strategy (ESS) has stated, is vitally important: “a strategic priority for Europe is a premise without which there will be little chance of resolving other problems in the Middle East. It is imperative that the European Union should remain determined and ready to mobilise resources to face the problem until it is solved”¹¹).

It is difficult if not impossible to resolve key international problems with lasting success without the US on board. Government and opposition leaders in Portugal are cognisant of this fact. The current weakness and lack of credibility of the US are seen as fundamental causes of weakened multilateralism. The Portuguese are broadly in favour of a multilateral order. After an initially passive attitude that focused on defending “small states” from the encroachment of large ones, today there is a broader view that without effective multilateralism it will be impossible to resolve global problems. Despite the support of the PSD government for the intervention in Iraq (which was opposed by the Socialist Party), there is a consensus now about the destabilizing impact of that action on the region.

The EU view is that effective multilateralism involves limits on state sovereignty and that the international community should intervene to protect the fundamental rights of citizens everywhere. This is similar to the new multilateralism concept developed in the framework of a Luso-Brazilian project¹², which also emphasised the important role of regionalism in the consolidation of democracy and the resolution of regional crises. However, China, India and Russia are states with a “strong

10 Nicole Gnesotto, « La sécurité dans un monde post-occidental », Esprit, May 2007.

11 European Security Strategy, A Safer Europe in a Better World, 12 December 2003.

12 See, The New Multilateralism, a Report by Alexandra Barahona de Brito and Álvaro de Vasconcelos, Forum Euro-Latin-American, Lisboa, October 2001

sovereignty” posture, and a much more conservative concept of multilateralism. More than a mode of shared international governance, or an instrument to resolve key international problems, multilateralism is, for them, an instrument to contain the more powerful states (notably the US and the EU). But multilateralism must do more than protect state sovereignty and independence if it is to be effective; it must be capable of resolving crises. Multipolarity can weaken multilateralism. One only has to ask whether the intervention in Kosovo to prevent crimes against humanity would be possible today; or how Russia and China would have reacted to that intervention today, to see that this is the case. Among the BRIC countries, Brazil (and Latin America with it) is the one most committed to multilateralism. It sees multilateralism as a way to counterbalance the power of the giant to the north; but it has a broader vision of effective multilateralism, as shown by its participation in the peace keeping mission in Haiti, and various initiatives to combat the poverty pandemic.

As new powers emerge, their wish to leave a global mark also increases, often to the detriment of efforts to achieve regional integration. Regionalism, one of the most promising aspects of international political developments in the 1990s, is in crisis because of multipolarity and the concomitant tendency toward bilateralism. Symptomatically, it was during Portugal’s first presidency that the foundations for political cooperation between the Union and the Mercosur were laid, after which the first EC-Mercosur ministerial meeting was held. That initiative was heralded in Portugal as the inauguration of multilateralism based on regionalism, a process that could humanize globalization and consolidate democracy and peace. Fifteen years later, the goal is no longer to have the South American integration project as a leading partner, but rather, as affirmed by Portuguese leaders, to help Brazil take on a global role as the leading power in Latin America. Hence, too, Portugal’s support for the Brazilian bid for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council.

As a multipolar world emerges, the EU faces the dilemma of recognising that international distribution of power is very fluid (so that special relationships with aspiring or consolidating “poles” come into play) and, yet managing to promote effective multilateralism linked to regionalism. In order to conciliate these opposing needs, there must be clarity about the current international situation and a programme for action which complies with founding EU values. The words of the

Portuguese prime minister at the European Parliament captured the bewilderment felt by various European leaders in the face of this state of international flux: “we live in a changing world that we still do not understand fully.”¹³ One of the most salient aspects of that change is how difficult the Union finds it to deal with newly emerging global players when these operate with a realist conception of international relations, and view multilateralism instrumentally as a way to contain the power of other major players, particularly the United States.

It is essential to have a political debate about multipolarity and multilateralism. The European Union must not confuse the two: multipolarity points to a more complex international sphere, and to the fact that the term unipolarity no longer serves to explain today’s international distribution of power (perhaps it never was: the limits on US power were already clear before the intervention in Iraq). The term multipolarity thus refers to the emergence of a plurality of global actors, which limit the power of the US superpower and that of other “poles.” More concretely, the term refers to the rise of China and – to some extent – India, to new Russian activism, and to the growing importance of players like Brazil, particularly in the sphere of international trade. It is recognised in Portugal that there is a new multipolar reality, and this is reflected in most of the relevant literature.

Some political leaders, particularly the Chinese and Russian, but also some European, attribute a normative dimension to multipolarity, arguing that a multipolar balance of power and alliance-building in particular, serve to counterbalance US power. But the EU de-legitimated power politics on the European continent, so it cannot defend global power politics, even under cover of a weak multilateralism; it cannot defend unipolarity either, as this inevitably leads to unilateralism. It is clear that both advocates of multipolarity and of unipolarity were unable to prevent the historical error that is the war in Iraq.

The EU is a unique international player, not because it could become a superpower, but because it operates according to the values of democracy, peace, solidarity and association among states. It is the most finished multilateral entity in existence, and it is seen by most countries and by vast sectors of the population of

¹³ Speech by Portuguese Prime Minister José Sócrates, during the presentation of the programme of the Portuguese Presidency to the European Parliament, 11 July 2007.

the great powers as a model that, *mutatis mutandi*, they would like to see govern international politics. That is why Celso Lafer called the EU an “international public good.”¹⁴ Above all, it is a model that leads by example: it has contributed decisively to the democratic integration of the bulk of the European continent; and people recognise that EU support for effective multilateralism is part of its identity, even though it is not always consistent in the pursuit of that goal. The relative success of multilateral initiatives such as the Kyoto Protocol and the International Criminal Court (ICC) is largely an EU achievement. And if both are only partial successes, it is precisely because they were not backed by the great powers, the US, China and Russia, which have refused to accept multilateral constraints on their military or economic power and policies.

The Course of the Portuguese Presidencies

It is in this context of emerging multipolarity that Portugal must address some crucial international issues. Whereas the dominant foreign and security policy topics in 1992 and 2000 were primarily European, in 2007 they are Eastern, African and global. The motto of the presidency, “A Stronger Union for a Better World,” is a global one, compared with the inward-oriented motto of 1992, “Toward the European Union.”

During the 1992 presidency, the Portuguese “discovered” the European Union. It allowed more parochial-minded elites to accept integration and to let go of complexes that had generated a sympathetic identification with British Euro-scepticism. During the 2000 presidency, Europe discovered Portugal. The then prime minister, António Guterres, became a central figure in the European Council and was held up as a possible future president of the Commission: Portugal did fill that post, although it was not the then leader of the PS but the leader of the PSD, José Manuel Barroso, who occupied it. Barroso’s election can be seen as the culmination of a phase of the process of Portuguese integration into Europe, beginning during the 1992 presidency with Cavaco Silva and continued under the Guterres governments; a process that placed Portugal, sometimes overly timidly, at the

heart of Europe. As a result of Portugal’s experience and its concerns with the role of states within the Union, the Portuguese have developed their own views of integration and so-called “true federalism”: this means support not for a European super-state à la américaine, but rather governance based on the dual legitimacy of states and citizens and solidarity. The so-called “Lisbon Strategy” is a product of that view. As regards the international identity of the Union, the term “open integration” encapsulates the Portuguese experience: open to the outside world, of course, but open also because it supports democracy and diversity^x.¹⁵ This is the experience of European integration that Barroso took with him to the Commission, and in these hard times, it can be particularly useful for Europe and Portugal.

Treaty reform is obviously a central issue, but the 2007 presidency can also be the moment of discovery of Portugal’s role in the world: that is what circumstances dictate it should be. As we saw, the first two presidencies were really about European issues: in 1992, it was urgent for the post-Maastricht Union to put an end to the Balkan wars, stem the tide of Serbian nationalism, and protect the Bosnians; in 2000, the dominant concern was to promote a new, information society based development strategy. This gave rise the Lisbon Strategy, the goal of which was to allow the EU to attain US levels of development and degree of competitiveness by 2010 without threatening cohesion and destroying the European social model.

The 2000 presidency, which coincided with the last year of the Clinton presidency, was also “Europe’s hour.” Given the coincidence of wills on both sides of the Atlantic, it was possible to push through Dayton Accord. Spurred on by the terrible spectacle of their impotence in Bosnia, France and Britain were able to reach an understanding at Saint Malo, giving rise to Europe’s new defence policy. At the time, the presidency of the EU strongly emphasised the need to create a structure for ESDP, and to clarify the relationship with NATO military structures; indeed, the Feira Council reiterated its “commitment to the creation of a Common Security and Defence Policy, able to reinforce the external action of the Union through the development of military capabilities to manage crises, as well as civilian capabilities, fully respecting the principles in the United Nations Charter.”¹⁶ Letting go of the conviction – deeply rooted since the end of the First World War – that it should stay

¹⁴ Celso Lafer, “A União Europeia, 50 Anos – as lições do passado e os desafios do futuro,” *Mundo em Português*, 64, May-June 2007.

¹⁵ Celso Lafer, “A União Europeia, 50 Anos – as lições do passado e os desafios do futuro,” *Mundo em Português*, 64, May-June 2007.

¹⁶ Conclusions of the Presidency, European Council of Santa Maria da Feira, 19-20 June 2000.

out of European conflicts, Portugal has maintained a significant military presence in the Balkans. The current Minister of Defence, Nuno Severiano Teixeira, feels that a European defence policy and a military component are necessary, since the Union was obviously unable to stop the Balkan wars, and because “successive postponements of intervention by the Atlantic Alliance, finally made it necessary to revise priorities.”¹⁷

In 1992 and 2000 it was still possible to think that the future of the Union lay essentially within Europe, and that the job of the Union was to redraw the map of the continent through pacification, democratisation and integration, goals that were achieved to a notable degree: democracy now functions from Portugal to the frontiers of Russia, and with the ESDP the Union has developed a capacity for autonomous foreign action. By contrast, in 2007 neither the Union nor its presidency can escape the issue of exercising of power in the world.

The specifics of the Portuguese view of EU global policy are not a result of its coincidentally having to organise the BRIC and African Union summits; rather, the Portuguese presidency has adopted a global outlook because it believes that this is what an “open Europe” should do. This is one of the reasons why Portugal organised the Euro-African and India summits (both held for the first time during the first half of 2000), and why it promoted the EU-Brazil Summit for July with the support of the Barroso Commission.

European foreign policy only makes sense if it contributes to “multilateralising multipolarity,” and forges strategic partnerships with regions or countries it identifies bilaterally as the most suited to deal with current global problems. “Multilateralising multipolarity” does not mean forging an anti-American alliance: Indeed, the opposite is the case: it means involving the US, first, as well as other key international players, in the creation of global rules and norms.

The idea of “multilateralising multipolarity” was already evident in the way that the president dealt with the EU-Brazil summit: “a closer relationship with Brazil will

also bring concrete results in terms of responding to global challenges,”¹⁸ in particular energy and environmental issues, and the Doha Round negotiations, which are seen by Portugal as issues requiring global regulation.

The tendency to address global governance issues at bilateral summits is a phenomenon that has also affected the Lisbon Strategy: in 2000, the view was intra-European; now it is seen as a strategy with a global dimension. The Portuguese view is that the Lisbon Strategy is a global one. As Maria João Rodrigues says, in the context of the pioneering project initiated by the IEEI: “the emergence of new competitive players,” and the fact that the development agendas of major powers are so similar, justifies a broad vision. Global governance is necessary if the goals of the Lisbon Strategy (technological innovation and socio-economic reform) are to become a reality, so “the external implementation of these two dimensions requires a change of the Lisbon Strategy, from a ‘domestic’ paradigm to an international cooperative one.”¹⁹

Forging a common agenda with all or some of the BRIC countries will make it possible to confront some major global challenges – poverty in Africa among them – more efficiently. Over the last few years, we have witnessed a significant decline in poverty in Asia, thanks to Chinese and Indian growth, but the situation in many African regions (where half of the population lives on less than 2 dollars a day), is getting worse. To make a difference, BRIC (Chinese, Indian and Brazilian) commitment is necessary (and possible), as is that of the US. This will make it possible to implement measures to attain the Millennium goals, and to balance the energy/environment equation so as to tackle the problem of climate change.

It is not enough, however, to have a global agenda focused on development, whatever its intrinsic benefits; it is also necessary for powerful countries or actors to make a shared effort to prevent major humanitarian tragedies, including those arising as a result of climate change and natural disasters, and those emerging from the crises and conflicts that still plague international life. One of the most difficult questions to address in a strategic dialogue at the BRIC summits (it has

¹⁷ Solemn Inaugural Session of the Academic Year, National Defence Institute (Instituto da Defesa Nacional, IDN), 5 December 2005.

¹⁸ Speech by Prime Minister José Sócrates, on the occasion of the presentation of the Programme of the Portuguese Presidency to the European Parliament, 11 July 2007.

¹⁹ Maria João Rodrigues, “The Lisbon Agenda in the European Union: Implications for Development and Innovation,” *Estratégia* (Lisbon) 22-23, 2007.

not been discussed, making only a vague appearance in the long-maturing strategy with the African Union) regards the conditions for the legitimate to use military force. This debate is even more difficult today because the US intervention in Iraq has generated so much opposition to military interventions in general, even humanitarian ones. But there are circumstances in which it may be necessary and legitimate to intervene without the consent of warring parties (to prevent crimes against humanity, for instance). Regardless of the configuration of the international system, it is imperative to establish the means to prevent tragedies such as those of Darfur and Rwanda.

The development of a shared economic and even political bilateral agenda among the great powers cannot distract the EU from the growing importance of other global players: regional or inter-regional associations, states, international organisations, and non-governmental organisations, which are sometimes the best standard bearers of the values that the EU wants to govern global regulation, and the best defenders of human rights.

The Danger of “European Multipolarity”

The belief that the problems of the world can be resolved by combining US hard power and European soft power, one which has a hold in Europe and is echoed on other continents, is no longer functional. But how can Europe have a say in what happens in the world? In Portugal, there was a durable preference to ally with the US, on the grounds that the US guaranteed national and European security as it had done during the Cold War. This attitude is clear in the pronouncements of Minister of Foreign Affairs Martins da Cruz: when explaining the reasons for Portuguese support for the Iraq venture, he noted that no one in their right mind would expect the French to help Portugal if the latter suffered a serious security threat. This belief is one of the pillars sustaining the ideology of Atlanticism in Portugal, and it does not accurately reflect global realities. It is not possible to return to the transitory unipolarity of the post-Cold War era.

But can the Union support an ideological-political notion of multipolarity? If it did, it would clash with the founding values of the European Union, which de-legitimised power politics among its members. The EU would have nothing to gain and everything to lose if it operated in a world governed by unstable power games and in which it would be one among various power players. If it is to have its say in world politics today, as in the past, the EU needs to work within a system governed by rules and norms.²⁰ But it cannot remain immobile or passive, the twin sisters of isolationism: it must be able to act to guarantee its own security and intervene to resolve crises elsewhere. For Portugal, as in other countries of the Union, the horror of European impotence in Bosnia led people to believe that it was necessary for the EU to develop its own military capabilities. In other words, the belief is that the Union must be able to intervene militarily, decisively if necessary, to resolve crises in some circumstances.

But EU military capabilities will be inoperative if they are not subordinate to a coherent and truly common foreign policy. If the member states of the Union are unable to develop effective common policies to revolve key international problems, particularly grave crises, the Union will be condemned to passivity. The Portuguese presidency is concerned that a possible unilateral declaration of independence in Kosovo may cause an insurmountable division among member states. Luís Amado believes that where this issue is concerned it is essential to preserve the unity of the Union. The Russian attitude to Kosovo can divide the Union. Sources close to the presidency suggest that Moscow has the capacity to do so, and is no less able than Washington to cause zizanie among Europeans.

Multipolarity poses a serious challenge to the unity and cohesion of the Union. It is possible that a new world governed by power politics can multipolarise Europe itself. Can it be that member States and new emerging power will establish bilateral relations, or will a common European perspective encompass such relations as must exist? This is a vital question; it has no answer as yet. It can be said that unity – which is to say coherence and cohesion – have never been so essential for an EU foreign and security policy deserving of the title, one that can have its say in the regions of the world that it considers to be a priority, starting with the European

²⁰ “The European Crisis and the World Order,” in: Hélio Jaguaribe and Álvaro de Vasconcelos (eds.), *The European Union, Mercosul and the New World Order*. London: Frank Cass, 2003.

continent itself and its near neighbourhood. There are no longer any regions of the world where the EU is the only global player as in the past: now others are making their presence felt as well.

In the current context, it is necessary to take the greatest possible care to avoid ruptures arising from the East-South divide in EU priority areas. The German presidency placed a strong emphasis on Eastern Europe and Central Asia; the Portuguese presidency has turned more toward the Mediterranean. The two countries agreed on this division of labour as members of the presidential trio. This division of responsibilities – Germany focusing on the East, Portugal concentrating on the South – was a serious mistake. It is worth remembering the huge effort expended at the end of the Cold War to ensure that there was a shared commitment to an east-south balance, and to get Germany interested in the Mediterranean. For the Portuguese government, the key to success is the European nature of Mediterranean policy (also true of policy towards the East) and the involvement of European institutions. Although it welcomes the Mediterranean Union initiative, Portugal underlines the need to ensure that European institutions are strongly involved.

Very probably, the new treaty that will reform CFSP and create the positions of President of the Council and Minister of Foreign Affairs will be approved during the Portuguese presidency. Can these new posts ensure that member state action in the international sphere becomes an integrated part of EU policy, and will they increase the scope of EU influence abroad? Can they ensure that each state is able to make a specific contribution that is nonetheless an integrated part of Union common action, even as the national presidencies, which have contributed to that specificity, cease to exist? There is no enthusiasm at all in Portugal for the end of the system of alternating leadership in the foreign policy arena. It is feared that this will reinforce an already emerging tendency to limit the role of the smaller countries, and that relations with those regions of the world to which the Portuguese presidencies have attached greatest importance – Latin America and Africa – will suffer.

III - The Internal as the External in Europe

The magnetism of the Union is a vital aspect of its soft power, and explains the high level of international interest in what happens within the Union; indeed, what happens within the Union is largely responsible for how it behaves outside its own borders, for the success or failure of its foreign policies. For the Union, domestic matters are *primus inter pares* among the factors shaping its foreign policy.²¹ This is because of the Union's "inter-mesticity." In fact, from a different perspective, the same can be said of the support of member States for the Union, and their willingness to support or carry out its foreign action.

The position of the Portuguese vis-à-vis the Union during the presidential semester is somewhat paradoxical: while the government is unambiguously "Europeanist," the general public is more sceptical than ever. It is susceptible to an "old guard" that once strongly supported accession and is now taking refuge in a defensive posture, fearful of economic and political competition, not just from European countries but globally (from China especially). This explains why the president of the Union of Banks criticized the Union for accepting Chinese membership of the

²¹ Álvaro de Vasconcelos, "O Papel da Europa num Mundo em Mudança", Intervenção no Forum Novas Fronteiras. (Porto: Palácio da Alfândega, 6 de Setembro de 2006.)

WTO, which in his view presents a strong threat to the interests of Portugal and other European states. These positions reflect that of traditional economic sectors that are used to state protection and want the EU to adopt a similarly protectionist role. There has been a decline in public support for the Union, after what was the enthusiastic backing of the 1990s, the golden years of integration and Portuguese economic development, when the rhythm of catching up accelerated, slowing down. Support for accession and the view that the Union is beneficial has been declining since 2000.

It is inevitable that the serious problems affecting Portuguese economic growth in the last years should have an impact on the image of the European project among the general population, particularly when the limits stipulated by the stability pact and growth, stagnation and the demand to “pinch pennies,” were held up in political debate as examples of external imposition. There has been no decline in support for the institutional reinforcement of the Union, even as the number of the Portuguese who feel that EU membership is positive has decreased from 66% in 2000 to 55% in 2007 (see appendices). On the contrary, there is clear support in Portugal for a more united and efficient Europe, a “support that is based on the acceptance of the European Union as a community and a political system.”²² Indeed, support for reinforced EU competences is particularly strong among Portuguese civil society organizations, as these hope that Europe will provide the stimulus and conditionality that promote Portuguese compliance with environmental norms, among others.

Wanting “more Europe” does not contradict dissatisfaction with current EU policies, or even the tendency in Portugal to reject the constitutional treaty as a way to express that dissatisfaction with the inability of the EU to respond to the needs of its citizens when it comes to issues like unemployment. José Sócrates, who succeeded José Manuel Durão Barroso as Prime Minister after the brief Santana Lopes interregnum, is well aware of the of there being a desire for “more Europe” and an increasingly less positive view of the Union.

²² Pedro Magalhães, “O apoio à integração europeia em Portugal: dimensões e tendências”, IPRI Working Paper 16, November 2006.

Prime Minister José Sócrates unapologetically calls for a politically autonomous Europe within the international arena, and is critical of the “Atlanticist” positions of the so-called “new European” states. But he agrees that there can be no European political autonomy if the political decisions of leaders in the Union lack democratic legitimacy.

The Portuguese prime minister underlines the need to overcome Europe’s democratic deficit and allow citizens to pronounce themselves on what the Union does. He has said that if citizens’ opposition to policies, actions or directives find no outlet, opposition could turn into a wholesale rejection of the European project: “we need mechanisms that allow citizens to have a say about the actions and political orientations of the Union, and there is no reason why [such mechanisms] should challenge the foundation of the European project itself.”²³ Whenever there are questions raised about an EU policy – be it agricultural, commercial or other – the Portuguese are tempted to criticize not just that specific policy arena, but the European project as a whole; and in extreme cases, even to question the decision to join the Community. The view that the Union is in a permanent state of crisis is a product of the fact that there are no mechanisms allowing citizens to distinguish between criticism of fundamental aspects of the European project and of specific orientations or policy options. This also partly explains the erosion of support for European integration in Portugal.

The Portuguese government does not deny that there is a democratic deficit, and against the majority view in Portugal, does not argue that the problem is solved just because the Council is made up of elected governments; nor does it argue that the deficit can be dealt merely by given more supervisory and controlling powers to national parliaments and by improving subsidiarity, a principle that is obviously essential but not sufficient to ensure that there is “a real appropriation of the European project by citizens.”²⁴ The latter requires mechanisms that “reinforce the supranational democratic system,” namely “through the European Parliament, which is a central element of a democratic Europe.” Witch does not contradict the fact that in Portugal there is strong support for a deeper involvement of national

²³ José Sócrates, Speech at the IEEI/Público Seminar, “Portugal and the Future of Europe Twenty Years after Accession”, 8 May 2007.

²⁴ Speech by Prime Minister José Sócrates on the occasion of the presentation of the Programme of the Portuguese Presidency to the European Parliament, 11 July 2007.

parliaments, national governments and the European Commission.²⁵ The prime minister's unequivocal support for the Constitutional Treaty also contrasts with the reserved attitude of the Portuguese diplomacy during the Convention.

In Portugal, one of the Convention debates that sparked a certain level of interest was the issue of identity. This is a country that is overwhelmingly Catholic and in which the Church, although not active in politics since the end of the dictatorship, is still active where "values" issues are concerned. The Catholic Church and some Catholic intellectuals supported the criticism of the Preamble made by Pope John Paul II because it did not refer to the Christian dimension of European identity. But this is a minority view among the Portuguese political elite. Even among those, like António Vitorino (who represented the Commission at the Convention, called for a reference to a religious heritage in the Preamble, wanted a reference to Europe's Jewish heritage and to "other religions historically present in the European space."²⁶ In other words, they wanted the affirmation of unity within diversity. That the European Union is not just Christian but political is confirmed by the Portuguese experience with European integration.

As stated by Guilherme d'Oliveira Martins, "the fundamental definition of the European Union today ... is a community with a plurality of ends and values."²⁷ Clearly, the debate has a lot to do with how national identity is constructed in a country that, for a good part of the twentieth century, was shaped by nationalist ideology, the rhetoric of "proudly standing alone" and of anti-Spanish sentiment. However, the view that "national identities coexist and are completed and enriched by opening up to a cosmopolitan and universalistic context" is gaining ground, even though the progression is not always linear.²⁸

Portugal's preference for an exclusively political or citizenship-based definition of European identity was linked initially not so much with the founding ideas of European integration (free voluntary association between states to ensure peace) but rather with the strong connection between democracy and integration. From 1975 onward, enlargement encompassed countries that were emerging not from

war like the original Six, but from dictatorship: Portugal, Spain and Greece, and later, the countries of Eastern Europe. Thus, the consolidation of democracy and integration were intertwined. The Union's democratic project became overriding, and enlargement came to be seen as the best way to protect democracy on the continent. At the same time, the de-legitimisation of old nationalisms on the Iberian Peninsula worked with integration to sweep away the nationalist discourse of the New State (Estado Novo) about the "Iberian enemy." After 1986, Spain quickly became Portugal's main economic partner, and an infrastructure network physically integrated Portugal within the Iberian Peninsula. Resistances to peninsular integration have not completely disappeared, as Durão Barroso and now José Sócrates have learnt from experience. As illustrated by the opposition of some Portuguese economic sectors to the network of high speed trains linking the Portuguese and Spain rail networks, there are still echoes of the old dream of piggybacking over Spain into the centre of Europe.²⁹ However, while they get some media coverage, these views are clearly those of a minority both among the public and within political circles.

Democracy, association between 'equal' states, the de-legitimisation of nationalism: these are essential aspects of open integration and the Constitutional Treaty aptly consecrated them with the motto "unity within diversity." It is essential to preserve this vital acquis of the Convention, particularly when pragmatism is held up as the way out of crisis in Europe, and the reformed treaty, or "simplified treaty," will not include the preamble of the Constitutional Treaty.

One of the most important issues, for the future of the European model and its global outreach, is the way its member States deal with immigration. Portugal is a country of immigrants by tradition and necessity, but today it is also a receiving country. Africans, Brazilians, Ukrainians and others are an important part of the resident population in Portugal. In less than a decade, the number of foreigners leapt from a few thousand to nearly half a million, or five percent of the 10 million-strong resident population.

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ António Vitorino, *Diário de Notícias*, 21-04-2006.

²⁷ Guilherme d'Oliveira Martins, *As fronteiras da Europa*, <http://www.umoderna.pt/tejo/turquia/fe.htm>

²⁸ See: Guilherme d'Oliveira Martins, *Portugal. Identidade e Diferença*. (Lisbon: Gradiva, 2007.)

²⁹ See: Álvaro de Vasconcelos, "O Comboio da Europa (The European Train)", *Público* (Lisbon), November 2003.

One of the deepest value challenges facing the Union is related with the rise of the extreme right and its xenophobic and anti-immigrant policies, and with a European policy that is being “communitarised” more in terms of security than in terms of integration and citizenship. Above all, unity within diversity means the ability to integrate immigrants and turn them into active participants in relations with the countries from whence they came. It has taken Portugal some time to use Luso-descended migrant communities as a vehicle of its foreign policy and national development. This is a recent change, and it appears in the programme of the presidency, which states that the Union should integrate immigrant communities as a part of its external relations, recognising the “contribution that diasporas can make to the development of their countries of origin with the support and commitment of European countries and relevant international institutions.” This is also why the presidency is supporting the adoption of a European Charter on the rights of Migrants. It is another classic example of an issue that is both domestic and international.

Portugal can claim some victories in what is very likely to be one of the last national presidencies of the European Union. First, there is an awareness that the Union cannot simply respond with bilateralism to multipolarity. Clearly, Portugal neither wishes nor can stand against the current of multipolarity; but it can push it in the direction of effective multilateralism. Second, there is the strong association between democracy and regional integration, and with a view of identity based on citizenship rather than culture. This trump card is not to be scoffed at in a context of “pragmatism” and renewed faith in “economic” instruments to solve the ills of humanity, as well as the persistent “securitisation” of national police forces the world over (trends that the Union has not known how to deflect).³⁰

The way that the Portuguese think about Europe is certainly the product of a more or less intense debate within intellectual and political circles, although all those involved in the European debate in Portugal know that these are subjects such as relations within the Portuguese speaking world or the problem of the Turkish membership are of the greatest public interest and should be broadly debated. But, as I hope I have demonstrated, European thought is above all a product of Portugal’s own experience with membership of, and increasingly active participation in, the

European project. In my view, this gives the Portuguese experience, in particular its presidencies, much “value-added” and justifies any attention they get, not least because, with the likely approval of the reform treaty, the end of the rotating presidencies is near, and it will then become necessary to find creative ways to ensure that the specific contributions of member States are not lost. In the debate about the Union and the global order, we would do well to reflect on the words of the Portuguese poet, Miguel Torga: “The universal is the local, but free of walls.”

³⁰ See, M.R. de Moraes Vaz, «El Triunfo de la Normalidad», in *Anuario Cidob* 2005. (Barcelona: Cidob, 2006.)

APPENDICES

Compiled by Monica Santos Silva, IEEI, Lisbon

BRIEF CHRONOLOGICAL BACKGROUND

Portugal and the European Union

- 1962 18 May:** Portugal officially submits its association application to the European Economic Community

- 1972 22 July:** A free trade agreement is signed between Portugal and the EEC

- 1973 1 January:** The trade agreements concluded between Portugal and the EEC enter into force

- 1977 28 March:** Portugal submits its membership application to the European Communities

- 1978 17 October:** Formal opening of accession negotiations with Portugal




- 1979 13 March:** Entry into force of the EMS

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|------|--|------|---|
| 1985 | 12 June: Signature of the Portuguese act of accession to the European Communities | 2001 | 26 February: Signature of the Nice Treaty, which enters into force on 1 February 2003
14-15 December: The European Council meets in Laeken, Belgium. A declaration on The Future of Europe is adopted |
| 1986 | 1 January: Formal accession of Portugal to the European Communities | 2002 | 1 January: The first Euro coins and notes come into circulation
28 February: Inaugural Session of the Convention on the Future of Europe
13 December: The Copenhagen European Council decides that the 10 candidate countries (Cyprus, Malta, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia) can accede to the EU on 1 May 2004. Bulgarian and Romanian accession is planned for 2007 |
| 1988 | 14 November: Portugal joins the WEU | 2003 | 20 June: Salónica European Council. Presentation of the draft Constitutional Treaty |
| 1990 | 1 July: Entry into force of the first stage of EMU | 2004 | 10-13 June: European Parliament elections
20 June: Brussels European Council. Approval of the European Constitution
27 June: Irish Prime Minister Bertie Ahern, then acting president of the EU, formally invites Durão Barroso to be president of the European Commission from 1 November onwards
29 October: Signature in Rome of the draft Constitutional Treaty by the Heads of State and Government of the 25 member States of the EU
1 November: José Manuel Durão Barroso becomes the 11th president of the European Commission |
| 1991 | 25 June: Portugal signs the Schengen agreements | 2005 | 22 June: Seventh Constitutional amendment in Portugal, adding a new article (295) to the constitution that allows referenda on the European treaty
3 October: Start of the Turkish and Croatian accession negotiations |
| 1992 | First semester: First Portuguese presidency
7 February: Signature of the Treaty on European Union
6 April: The Escudo enters the EMS exchange rate mechanism | | |
| 1993 | 1 November: The Treaty on European Union enters into force | | |
| 1994 | 1 January: Entry into force of the second stage of EMU | | |
| 1997 | 2 October: Signature of the Treaty of Amsterdam | | |
| 1999 | 1 January: Entry into force of the third stage of EMU, with the participation of Portugal
1 May: Entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam | | |
| 2000 | First semester: Second Portuguese presidency of the EU
22-23 March: Lisbon European Council. The Lisbon Strategy is launched, to attain full employment in the EU and make its economy the most competitive in the world by 2010.
7-9 December: Intergovernmental Conference ends with a political agreement on the Nice Treaty | | |

2007 **1 January:** The fifth enlargement of the EU ends with Romanian and Bulgarian accession, increasing the number of member States to 27
24-25 March: Signature of the Berlin Declaration at the commemoration of the 50th anniversary of the Rome Treaties
21-22 June: The Brussels European Council outlines the ICG mandate
1 July: Third Portuguese presidency of the EU
23 July: The Portuguese presidency of the EU launched the ICG that must redraft a new European Treaty by October
18-19 October: Informal EU leaders' summit, at which the new Reform Treaty is to be presented

2009 **June:** European Parliament elections

'CATCHING UP' WITH THE EU



DECLINING EUROPHILIA?

Is membership in the EU a 'good thing' or a 'bad thing'?


	Good thing		Bad thing		Neither good nor bad		Don't know	
	Portugal	EU Average	Portugal	EU Average	Portugal	EU Average	Portugal	EU Average
2000	64	49	5	14	22	28	10	9
2001	57	48	8	13	27	29	9	10
2002	62	53	7	11	24	28	7	8
2003	61	54	9	11	24	27	6	7
2004	55	48	13	17	24	29	7	6
2005	61	54	12	15	21	27	7	4
2006	47	55	14	13	32	28	7	4
2007	55	57	15	15	27	25	3	3

Source: Eurobarometer (several issues)

Benefits of EU membership


	Beneficial		Not beneficial		Don't know	
	Portugal	EU Average	Portugal	EU Average	Portugal	EU Average
2000	71	47	11	32	18	21
2001	68	45	16	30	17	25
2002	69	51	16	26	15	23
2003	68	50	20	29	12	21

EU membership 'a good thing'



Source: Eurobarometer (several issues)

EU membership 'beneficial'



Source: Eurobarometer (several issues)

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